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Abstract 
Jeffrey's rule has been generalized by Wagner 
to the case in which new evidence bounds the 
possible revisions of a prior probability below 
by a Dempsterian lower probability. Classical 
probability kinematics arises within this gen­
eralization as the special case in which the 
evidentiary focal elements of the bounding 
lower probability are pairwise disjoint. We 
discuss a twofold extension of this general­
ization, first allowing the lower bound to be 
any two-monotone capacity and then allow­
ing the prior to be a lower envelope. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The revision of prior p to posterior q = p(\E) is appro­
priate if and only if one judges that q( E) = 1 and that 
q(A\E) = p(A!E) for all events A. Radical probabilism 
(Jeffrey, 1985) recoils from dogmatic judgments like 
q(E) = 1, but is fortunately not deprived thereby of 
a principled method of probability revision, employ­
ing instead of simple conditioning the generalization 
(Jeffrey, 1965), 
q(A) = E J.tEP(AIE). (1) 
BE& 
Here C is a countable collection of nonempty, pairwise 
disjoint events and {J.tE : E E £} a family of positive 
reals summing to one. To be justified in revising p by 
(1) one must judge, based on the total evidence, that 
q(E) = J.tE, for every E E £, (2) 
and that, for all events A, 
q(A)E) = p(A)E), for every E E £. {3) 
Jeffrey describes q as coming from p by probability 
kinematics, the analogy with mechanics residing in the 
"conservation of conditional probabilities" posited by 
(3). 
It has been observed that formula (1) can be derived 
by Dempster's rule (Shafer, 1981), and by relative in­
formation minimization (May, 1976). More recently, 
three different asymmetrical rules for combining belief 
functions have been proposed (Ichihashi and Tanaka, 
1991), each of which contains (1) as a special case. 
As we argue below in more detail, these approaches 
to the updating of assessments of uncertainty are se­
riously incomplete, furnishing only a generalization 
of (1), but no generalization of the key criterion (3) 
for implementing (1). What they provide are merely 
formal generalizations of Jeffrey's rule, or what have 
been called "mechanical updating" methods (Diaco­
nis and Zabell, 1982). We would maintain that any 
updating formula true to the spirit of classical prob­
ability kinematics must be furnished with a warrant­
ing conservation -of-conditional probability criterion of 
some sort. In what follows, we outline such a general­
ization of Jeffrey conditionalization. 
2 GENERALIZED PROBABILITY 
KINEMATICS 
In the following generalization of classical probability 
kinematics, new evidence, rather than fixing certain 
values of the posterior q, merely places a lower bound 
on the values of q. We first examine the case in which 
the set function furnishing this lower bound is a Demp­
sterian lower probability. Full details may be found in 
Wagner (1990). 
Let the finite set X be equipped with a prior probabil­
ity measure p, assumed to be positive on all nonempty 
subsets of X. Suppose that additional evidence, in 
conjunction with our prior evidence, enables us to 
assess a positive probability measure u over subsets 
of a finite, related set of possibilities Y, and that 
our understanding of the relation between outcomes 
in Y and those in X is summarized in a function 
r: Y--+ 2x- {0}, where for each y E Y, f(y) de­
notes the set of outcomes in X compatible with y. 
As noted by Dempster (1967), u and r induce three 
interesting set functions m, b, and a, on X, defined for 
all E �X by 
m(E) = u{y E Y: f(y) = E}, (4) 
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b(E) = L m(H) = u{y E Y: f(y) £ E} (5) 
and 
a( E) = 1 - b(E) = u{y E Y : r(y) n E f- 0}. (6) 
Members of the family£= {E r;;; X : m(E) > 0} are 
called evidentiary focal elements. Members of £ are 
not in general pairwise disjoint. 
Since b(E) (respectively, a( E)) is the sum of the prob­
abilities of all outcomes in Y that entail (respectively, 
do not preclude) the event E, it is clear that the evi­
dence manifested in u and r restricts possible revisions 
of p to those probability measures bounded below by b 
and above by a, the latter restriction being redundant 
in virtue of (6). 
The probability measures on X bounded below by 
b are shown in Wagner (1990) to be precisely the 
marginalizations to X of joint probability measures 
Q on X x Y that are compatible with u and r in the 
sense that 1) the marginalization of Q to Y is u and 
2) x ¢. r(y) => Q(z, y) = 0. Indeed, b is the lower en­
velope of all such marginalizations. We may of course 
never arrive at a fully specified probability measure Q 
on X x Y. But we might judge, nevertheless, that were 
we to arrive at such a Q, it would satisfy, for all A r;;; X 
and all E E £, 
Q( ''A" I "E.") = p(AIE), (7) 
where E. = {y E Y : f(y) = E}, "A" = A x Y, and 
"E." = X x E • .  To adopt (7) is to judge that the 
total impact of the occurrence of the event E. is to 
preclude the occurrence of any outcomes x rJ. E, and 
that, within E, p can be assumed to remain operative 
in the assessment of relative uncertainties. 
There may well be an infinite number of joint proba­
bility measures Q compatible with u and r, and satis­
fying the conservation-of-conditional-probability con­
dition (7). Their marginalizations to X are, however, 
identically equal to the probability measure q, defined 
for all A r;;; X by 
q(A) = L m(E)p(AIE). (8) 
EE£ 
The probability q is thus the uniquely acceptable re­
vision of p that is bounded below by b, given that 
(7) is judged to hold. This account furnishes a 
complete generalization of Jeffrey conditionalization, 
which amounts to the special case of the above in 
which the family £ is pairwise disjoint. For in that 
case the conditions q ;:::: b and (7) are equivalent to 
Jeffrey's criteria (2) and (3), with IJ-E = m(E) = b(E) , 
and (8) reduces to the classical kinematical rule (1). 
3 BOUNDING POSTERIORS BY 
TWO-MONOTONE CAPACITIES 
Dempsterian lower probabilities, arising from the pro­
jection of probability measures via compatibility rela­
tions, are highly structured set functions. Indeed, it 
can be shown for any b defined by (5) that, for all r � 2 
and every sequence A1, .. . , Ar of subsets of X, 
b(AtU ... UAr) 2: L (-l)f!f-1b(n;e1A;). 
I£{l, . .. ,r} 
1#0 
(9) 
Thus every Dempsterian lower probability is what 
Choquet ( 1953) calls an infinitely monotone capacity, 
or what Shafer (1976) calls a belief function. 
While there is a substantial difference of opinion about 
what properties a set function must possess to qual­
ify as a lower probability, no one would maintain 
that the infinitely monotone capacities exhaust the 
class of lower probabilities. Indeed, following Walley's 
(1981) adaptation of di Finetti (1974), we might de­
fine the lower probability of an event A to be a number 
c(A) E [0, I] such that we are prepared to pay any price 
less than c(A) to receive one unit (of some appropri­
ate good - perhaps Smith's (1961) "probability cur­
rency") if A occurs and nothing otherwise. As Walley 
has shown, coherence of the values c(A) puts rather 
mild structural restrictions on c, amounting only to 
the requirement that c be the lower envelope of the 
set of all probability measures that dominate it. In 
particular, a coherent lower probability c will always 
be superadditive (AnB = 0 => c(AUB);:::: c(A)+c(B)) 
and hence monotone A £ B => c(A) :5 c(B)). 
Suppose, generalizing the case treated in §2 above, 
that having assessed a positive prior p on subsets of 
the finite set X, we are apprised of additional evi­
dence that bounds any acceptable revision of p below 
by the coherent lower probability c. Define the Mobius 
transform, m, of c by 
m(E) = L (-l)fE-Hfc(H). (10) 
Ht:;;_E 
It is easy to show that m(0) = 0 and that, for all 
Ar;;;x, 
c(A) = L m(E). (11) 
E�A 
In particular, L m(E) = c(X) = 1. When c is a 
ECX 
Dempsterian low�r probability b, m, as defined by (10), 
is identical with m, as defined by (4). Along with 
(11), this demonstrates fairly conclusively that (10) 
is the right generalization of ( 4). In this setting, m 
may take negative values (indeed, will take at least 
one negative value if c is not infinitely monotone - see 
Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989)). But, emboldened by 
our generalization of m, let us simply appropriate the 
carefully derived revision formula (8) from §2, and see 
what it can do for us here, i.e., let us consider the set 
function q, defined for all A r;;; X by 
q(A) = L m(E)p(AjE) {12) 
EE£ 
where m is now defined by (10) and £ = {E � X : 
m(E) i 0}. 
Notwithstanding the fact that some of the numbers 
m(E) in (12) may be negative, q is always a proba­
bility measure, as a consequence of the monotonicity 
of c. More strikingly, if c is 2-monotone (c(A n B) ;::: 
c(A) + c(B)- c(A n B)), then q always dominates c. 
Indeed, these results characterize monotonicity and 2-
monotonicity. Proofs of these theorems may be found 
in Sundberg and Wagner (1990 ). 
So if additional evidence places a 2-monotone lower 
bound c on possible revisions of the prior p, the prob­
ability measure q defined by (12) is at least in the 
running to be chosen as the posterior. But we do not 
yet have a criterion, of the type furnished by (7) when 
c is a Dempsterian lower probability, that would single 
out q as the uniquely acceptable posterior. Hence, at 
this point, (12) has only the status of a formal gen­
eralization of (8) to the case of a 2-monotone lower 
bound. 
4 REVISING A PRIOR LOWER 
PROBABILITY 
Suppose that, having assessed a coherent lower proba­
bility f. over subsets of X, we are apprised of additional 
evidence establishing with certainty that the true state 
of affairs lies in the subset E, so that any revision >. of 
f. must satisfy >.(E) == 1. A natural way to extend ). 
to arbitrary subsets A is to set 
>.(A) == (13) 
£<b)(AIE) := inf{p(AIE): pis a probability 
measure dominating f. and p(E) > 0 }. 
This revision method, known as Bayesian condition­
ing, goes back at least as far as Dempster (1967). It 
can be applied as long as f.(E) < 1, even if i(E) = 0. 
Iff is 2-monotone, one can establish the nice formula 
1-.b)(AIE ) _ f.(A n E) ( ) - f.(AnE)+1-f.(AUE) 
1 4 
A proof of (14) appears in Sundberg and Wagner 
(1991 ), where it is also shown that if f. is r-monotone 
(i.e., satisfies (9) with b replaced by f for the fixed inte­
gerr), then so isf(b)(IE). This generalizes earlier par­
tial results of Walley (1981), Jaffray (1990), and Fagin 
and Halpern (1990). Preservation of r-monotonicity 
under Bayesian conditioning puts this type of condi­
tioning formally on par with two other types, geomet­
ric conditioning (Suppes and Zanotti, 19 77) defined 
by 
f(Dl(AIE) ·= 
f.(A n E) 
(15) . l(E) 
and Dempsterian conditioning (Dempster, 1967), de­
fined by 
1-.dl(AIE) := 
l(A u E) - l(E) 
1- f.( E) 
(16) 
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Formulae (14), (15), and (16) agree if f.(E) + l(E) = 
1, but in general they disagre�) it being certain only that f.(6)(AIE) exceeds neither £1.9)(AIE) nor f.(d)(AIE). 
Bayesian conditioning is thus the most conservative of 
these methods. Here again, however, results are purely 
formal. The difficult work of articulating criteria for 
employing these conditioning methods remains to be 
done. 
Clearly one encounters challenging problems in revis­
ing a prior lower probability even in the "dogmatic" 
case where evidence renders it certain that the truth 
lies in E. In the spirit of radical probabilism, however, 
one ought to investigate the problem of revising a prior 
£1, given evidence that simply places a lower bound £2 
on possible revisions >.. 
One revision formula worth exploring is 
A(A) = 
inf{ L m2(E)p(AIE): pis a probability 
EE£, 
(17) 
measure dominating £1 and positive on £2}, 
where m2 is the Mobius transform of !.2 and £2 its set 
of focal elements. A theorem of Sundberg and Wagner 
(1990) mentioned earlier guarantees that ..\,when well 
defined, is a coherent lower probability dominating £2, 
as long as !.1 is coherent and f2 is 2-monotone. Note 
that (12) and (13) are special cases of (1 7). When £2 is 
a Dempsterian lower probability there is a criterion in 
the spirit of (7) for revising l1 by (17). Whether such 
a criterion can be articulated in more general cases 
remains to be seen. 
Note that ( 1 7) is not in computationally tractable form 
(neither was (13) until (14) came to light ), although 
there are easily computable lower bounds on ..\. If 
>. is sometimes the proper revision of £1, and if no 
simple formula for ), emerges, then we may need to 
adjust to the idea of merely approximating an ideal 
posterior. Of course there may be superior alternatives 
to (17) in special cases, just as (15) and (16) may be 
on occasion superior to (13). A thorough investigation 
of this issue would appear to be both mathematically 
and philosophically interesting. 
5 OTHER APPROACHES 
The generalizations of classical probability kinematics 
described above furnish a perspective on attempted 
deconstructions of Jeffrey's rule as uninteresting spe­
cial cases of (1) relative information minimization and 
(2) Dempster's rule, and suggest that these attempts 
are fundamentally misguided. 
In the first case it has been observed (e.g., by May 
(1976)) that Jeffrey's formula ( 1), rather than being 
derived from (2) and (3), can be derived by minimizing 
the relative information measure 
I(q, p) := L q(x) log(q(x)/p(x)) (18) 
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over those q simply satisfying (2). Relative informa­
tion minimization methods (also called maxent meth­
ods) may appear to furnish a powerful general method 
of updating a prior, subject to any constraints that 
yield a closed convex subset of possible posterior prob­
ability measures. But some convincing arguments 
have been advanced against maxent (e.g., by Skyrms 
(1987)) as a general updating method. 
More particularly, when maxent is used to supplant 
Jeffrey's rule, the key conservation-of-conditional­
probability criterion (3) for implementing that rule 
is discarded, resulting in what Diaconis and Zabel! 
(1982) label "mechanical updating ." But the decisive 
argument against viewing Jeffrey's rule as a special 
case of maxent is that the natural generalization of 
that rule furnished by (8) need not minimize l(q,p) 
among all q 2:: b (Wagner, 1990). Since (8) is demon­
strably the correct wa.y to update p, given (7) and the 
restriction q 2:: b, this furnishes a counterexample to 
the general reasonableness of maxent updating , and 
also shows that it is simply a fluke that maxent and 
Jeffrey 's rule coincide. 
As for using Dempster's rule in place of Jeffrey's, 
Shafer (1981) has shown how to construct a belief func­
tion (3 such that p at  {3, the result of combining the 
prior p with (3 by Dempster's rule, coincides with q, 
as defined by (1). Indeed, one can cook up a num­
ber of different belief functions f3 with this property, 
which suggests a certain artificiality of construction. 
As in the case of maxent, the key conservation condi­
tion (3) is obscured by this analysis. Interestingly, for 
the generalization (8) of (1 ), one can also construct a 
belief function (3 (not, by the way, the naturally oc­
curing lower bound b) such that pat f3 = q (Wagner, 
1990). But when one enters the realm of probabil­
ity revision subject to a merely two-monotone lower 
bound one is (probably in the case of (12) and defi­
nitely in the case of (17)) outside the area of applica­
tion of Dempster's rule, which applies only to belief 
functions and always yields a belief function . Thus 
a sufficiently broad generalization of probability kine­
matics can be expected to transcend even a formal 
rendering in terms of Dempster's rule. 
We conclude by considering three asymmetrical rules 
for combining belief functions, each of which formally 
generalizes (1), and indeed (8). Given belief functions 
b1 and 62 on X with associated Mobius transforms (or 
basic probability assignments) m1. and m2, Ichihashi 
and Tanaka (1989) define (though with different nota­
tion) 
mdm2(H) == L 
(E, F) E £1 x £2 
EnF=H 
m1(E)m2(F) 
(19) 
1-bt(F) 
(20) 
and 
mtlllm2(H) = mt(H) L 1 :
2
6(��) ' (21) FnH#;I 1 
where Ci = {H � X : m;(H) > 0}, i = 1, 2. In this 
form, these rules appear quite opaque. If we sum these 
expressions over all subsets H � A (which, strangely, 
lchihashi and Tanaka do not do) we get the much 
clearer rules 
and 
bdb2(A) 
L m2(F)bt(AUF)-bt(F) (22) 
FE£� 1-bt(F) 
L m2(F)b�d)(AjF), 
btl lb2(A) 
= L m2(F) b1(A n F) 
FE£� bt(F) 
= L m2(F)b�9)(AjF), 
FE£, 
btlllb2(A) 
(23) 
L m2(F)bt(A) -b1(AnF) (24) 
Fe£, 1-b1 (F) 
L m2(F)blit)(AjF) 
Fee, 
It is immediately clear from these formulas that (22), 
(23), and (24) define belief functions, and that they 
each yield (8) when bt = p and b2 == b, and so ex­
tend not merely Jeffrey's rule (as Ishihaski and Tanaka 
note) but generalized probability kinematics as well, at 
least formally. It is also easy to check that btlb2(A) � 
b2(A) and bdlb2(A) � b2(A), which is in the spirit of 
generalized kinematics. It is not clear that this is true 
for bd\\b2(A), due to a rather odd feature of what we 
have denoted blit\AIF), namely that it is possible that 
b�it)(FjF) <I! From our perspective .this undermines 
(24) even as a formal generalization of Jeffrey's rule. 
As for (22) and (23), they are subject to the same 
criticism that we have directed at other attempts to 
generalize Jeffrey's rule, in that they are furnished 
with no criterion which warrants their use. We are 
thus reminded once again that any revision rule de­
serving to be viewed as a generalization of condi­
tionalization needs to be grounded both on new ev­
idence (as incorporated in specified values or lower 
bounds on the values of the posterior) and on a judge­
ment about the continued relevance of our prior uncer­
tainty assessments (as incorporated in a. conservation­
of-conditional-probability criterion) 
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